A kingdom for a horse: the lawsuit that led to United’s decline

GUARDIAN DESIGN/ GETTY IMAGES 

Racehorse Rock of Gibraltar, Avram 

and Joel Glazer and Michael Carrick

‘Like all tragedies, it begins with a small moment’

Jonathan Wilson reflects on how the Rock of Gibraltar affair led to United’s demise

Dramatic fallout between Alex Ferguson and a former shareholder ushered in this era of failure at Old Trafford

For 20 years, United have been addled by debt and have made consistently terrible decisions

27 Oct 2026 - The Guardian

Jonathan Wilson

And so here we are again, at that point as the nights draw in and Manchester United prepare to sack a manager. Autumn: season of mists, mellow fruitfulness and a crisis at Old Trafford. The 3-0 home defeat against Bournemouth on Sunday, coming on the back of the 4-1 reverse against Como last week, made clear what many had feared from the moment Michael Carrick was given the job on a permanent basis: that he isn’t up to it.

But then, who could be? When you’ve burned through a long list of managers in 13 years, it’s perhaps worth considering whether the manager is really the problem. Could some blame perhaps go to the director of football, Jason Wilcox, or the chief executive, Omar Berrada, the people making the appointments? Or perhaps to

Sir Jim Ratcliffe, the cost-cutting tax exile and minority shareholder with responsibility for sporting operations? Or to the Glazer family, who plunged the club into debt with a leveraged buyout in 2005 and have since made calamitous decision after calamitous decision, reducing the most successful club in English league history to a mid-table laughing stock with a roof that leaks symbolically?

It’s worth remembering where all this began. The United story has taken on the aspect of a classical tragedy and, like all good tragedies, it begins with a small, seemingly unconnected moment, amplified by pride, that ends up bringing the whole edifice crashing down.

In 1999, Mull of Kintyre, a horse owned by the Irish millionaire John Magnier, won the Gimcrack Stakes at York. Traditionally, the winning owner would give a speech at the Gimcrack dinner, but Magnier was a shy man who hated public speaking so he asked his friend, the Manchester United manager Alex Ferguson, to give the speech on his behalf. The racing establishment, though, refused: it had to be the owner. To spite them, Magnier named Ferguson as the owner of another horse, Juniper. The following year, Juniper was narrowly beaten in the Gimcrack Stakes. Magnier, though, was determined. So the year after that, he made Ferguson the owner of Rock of Gibraltar, which had won its first three races. Rock of Gibraltar won the Gimcrack easily and Magnier, waving a metaphorical two fingers at the racing authorities, watched Ferguson give the speech.

Magnier was largely making mischief, but he was also happy to do a favour for a friend, to give Ferguson a better experience of racing, and he benefited from the association of the horse with such a famous name. In addition, Ferguson did not get on well with the United chairman Martin Edwards, and had a sense that football clubs were becoming good investments. Accordingly Magnier and his associate JP McManus bought shares in United.

It turned out, though, that Rock of Gibraltar was a much better horse than anybody had realised, winning seven Group One races in a row. The stud fees would be worth tens of millions of pounds. Ferguson believed the verbal deal was that he could choose 50% of the prize money won by Rock of Gibraltar (about £800,000) or 50% of the stud fees, which ended up being worth tens of millions. He went for the latter. Magnier’s recollection was rather different: 5% of the prize money or one stud nomination a year.

Ferguson sued and, with his name on the ownership documents, probably would have won had it gone to trial. But then rumours started to spread about some of Ferguson’s financial dealings at United. Paid actors at United’s annual general meeting raised awkward points, then Magnier and McManus sent a list of 99 questions to the United board, which mysteriously found their way into the Daily Mail. United were highly embarrassed. Fans began to demonstrate against Magnier and McManus

at race meetings. A settlement was reached, with Ferguson paid £2.5m to drop the action. But the damage was done.

Magnier and McManus had decided to sell their shares in United, and another shareholder was ready and waiting: Malcolm Glazer. Ferguson backed Glazer, who launched his leveraged buyout. Magnier and McManus sold up in 2005 for £260m, a profit of a little under £100m. Had they waited for Ratcliffe, who bought a similar stake in 2024, they would have received roughly £1bn more than that. For Ferguson, a threat had been dealt with.

The problem was that Glazer and his family would prove some of the worst club owners in English history. For 20 years, United have been addled by debt and have made consistently terrible footballing decisions. Ferguson’s team was good enough, and his personality big enough, that United won five league titles and a Champions League after the takeover, but once his genius had gone, there was nothing left.

A mismatched squad built up over seven flawed managerial appointments and conflicting approaches will not readily be sorted out. Carrick is the latest victim of a crisis 21 years in the making. For the want of a horse, a club was lost.

***

Numbers show how Carrick’s luck was bound to run out

Carrick doomed by less favourable circumstances

United’s success at the end of last season came from an unsustainable amount of narrow victories

27 Oct 2026

The Guardian - Andrew Beasley

Manchester United have been the third-best team in the Premier League with Michael Carrick as their head coach. It is some effort for his job to be so under threat when only Arsenal (57 points) and Manchester City (56) have been more productive than United (46) during the 45-year-old’s tenure.

The tally obscures pertinent facts. United topping the Premier League during his 17-match interim spell last season is irrelevant when they sit 16th with no win in eight games in all competitions this season. Losing narrowly against City is one thing, but three-goal defeats by Como and Bournemouth will surely spell managerial change.

Carrick can point to a degree of misfortune. Conceding stoppagetime equalisers to Everton and Tottenham was costly, although they also required an 89th-minute goal to avoid losing at Fulham, who were winless at the time.

Opta’s expected points model suggests United have earned 3.8 points fewer than their underlying statistical performances merit in 2026-27. Only three clubs are further adrift of where they can reasonably expect to be.

Equally, United’s expected position of 10th is hardly befitting a club whose net transfer spend this summer topped all those outside the Premier League bar Real Madrid, even before we consider their annual revenue and illustrious history. Their par level remains uninspiring.

If they have been a touch unlucky with results, it was almost an inevitable outcome. United outperformed their expected points by 12.7 in Carrick’s share of 2025-26, 7.6 more than any other club. Such fortune was never going to last, as any back office paying the remotest attention to data would know. Poor recruitment in the summer increased the likelihood of a slump.

The run of results appeared as unsustainable as it has proven. Eight of United’s 12 league wins under Carrick last season were by one goal. In that time, only Napoli (nine) had more such victories in Europe’s big five leagues. The expected goal margin was no more than 0.6 in United’s favour in five of those eight victories and they lost the xG by about 0.6 in their draws at West Ham and Sunderland. A lot of coin-flips went in their favour.

United’s woes are not simply the result of luck turning against them. They are incapable of breaking down teams when dominating the ball. Something that seemed insurmountable for Ole Gunnar Solskjaer has also hampered Carrick. Meet the new overpromoted club legend, same as the old overpromoted club legend.

In Carrick’s first game, United won a Manchester derby despite having 32% possession. They were similarly ball-averse in victories against Liverpool (38%), Chelsea (40%) and Arsenal (43%) last season. Yet they have drawn blanks against Hull and Bournemouth in 2026-27 despite having 72% and 63% possession respectively. They were also unable to break down City when having a man advantage for three-quarters of the contest and 55% possession.

United lead the division for shots, but no team have had a higher proportion of their efforts from outside the area, which explains why their non-penalty expected goals per shot average is the second-worst in the Premier League.

It is therefore fair to question Carrick’s tactical blueprint, as Bruno Fernandes did after defeat by Como. “Whatever system you play, whatever tactics you play, if you don’t run, and you don’t run forward, and you don’t run back, you ain’t going to win,” was Carrick’s response to his captain’s comments. A look at United’s physical data justifies his concern.

There is little correlation between distance covered and success. Arsenal lead the league for kilometres per match this season (119.4) but Fulham (119.0) are second. United are third-bottom, though their 112.3km per game average is up on the 102.2km they posted for Carrick in 2025-26.

Far more notable is the shift in sprints. Data from Gradient Sports shows United’s outfield players are averaging fewer sprints per 90 minutes than they did under Carrick last season. Youri Tielemans is not just below his figure for Aston Villa in 2025-26, he is barely at the level Casemiro offered despite being five years his junior.

The increase in average possession from 49.1% under Carrick last season to 56.7% may partially explain why United are sprinting less. However, City lead the Premier League for possession (64.7%) and average marginally fewer sprints than United, while Arsenal have the second-most ball (61.1%) and sprint more often. It seems unlikely United’s sprinting decline is entirely by design.

Have the players stopped trying for Carrick? Or do they simply no longer have the advantage of free weeks thanks to the Champions League qualification his success brought? Wherever the truth lies, intensity has dropped. The favourable circumstances of last season have gone and Carrick does not look up to the task of navigating a far more challenging campaign.